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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a large scale online experiment with a nationally 
representative sample from the United Kingdom to look at the effect of price 
changes, and ways in which these price changes are signposted, on healthy diet 
choice in relation to soft drinks and breakfast cereals (cereals in the rest of the 
paper). Experimental participants used real budgets and had an opportunity to 
buy real groceries online which were then delivered to their door. The groceries 
were from a list of almost 1,000 products offered by Tesco, the largest U.K. 
supermarket retailer, and checks were made for any effect of online purchases 
on later purchases to better identify the net effect of our potential policy 
interventions. We use a purpose-built online supermarket that is carefully 
modelled on a major real world online supermarket (Tesco.com; for further 
details about the online supermarket platform including an interactive link, see 
section 3). The platform enables us to examine shoppers’ purchases in a setting 
which is close to a real online supermarket, while fully preserving experimental 
control to help ensure interpretability of our empirical findings. We model taxes 
of 20% or 40%, either simply as a price change or minimally signposted with 
the amount of the tax, marked with T, next to the baseline price. 
There has been considerable recent policy interest in the potential use of fiscal 
policy to influence dietary behavior (Mytton et al., 2012), for example in the 
form of a ‘fat tax’ or of a ‘sugar tax’ as already trialed in different forms in 
Australia, Chile, Denmark, France, Hungary, Mexico and Norway (Cornelsen 
and Carreido 2015; Public Health England, 2015) and since April 2018 also in 
the UK (UK Government, 2016). The WHO (2016) has recently recommended 
the introduction of a 20% tax on soft drinks worldwide – a conclusion that is 
(ex post) supported by the findings of a recent systematic review of taxation to 
promote health behaviors not only in terms of diet (Wright et al., 2017). There 
is in principle a defendable justification for public policy to correct what may 
be conceived as a market failure associated with the external costs arising from 
obesity (Cawley and Frisvold, 2017). A public policy response may also be 
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justified on the basis of internalities, in the sense that at least a share of the 
health consequences incurred are not taken into account by the individual when 
making his or her food choices (e.g., Griffith et al, 2018). 
Our study is useful and innovative in several respects against the existing 
literature. In terms of price interventions, as discussed in the literature review 
in the next section, the evidence from the small number of policy impact 
evaluations is surprisingly mixed, and the limitations of epidemiological 
modelling studies and econometric analysis make a complementary 
experimental approach useful. Unfortunately, as reviewed in the next section, 
the existing experimental evidence on price interventions is also mixed (e.g. 
Epstein et al., 2012; Shemilt et al., 2013) and has limitations in terms of very 
small number of studies properly incentivized, in terms of structuring the 
shopping task as an artificial assignment and in terms of complete lack of 
control for compensation effects between shopping in and outside the laboratory; 
almost all of it is also with students or other convenience samples. These 
limitations largely affect the only one previous and important study (Chetty et 
al., 2009) that combines price with signposting in a diet context; their 
signposting is also implemented in a different way than ours (see section 2). 
In our study budgets and purchases are for real, i.e. participants are given 
budget and groceries (cereals and soft drinks) that will be delivered via a real 
supermarket to their doorstep. We also restrict the sample of participants to 
people that have a latent demand for the product categories being considered, in 
that they have consumed cereals and soft drinks at least once in the last month. 
This avoids any power reduction and estimation bias by including people who 
do not generally buy either, but who may spuriously feel they have to in an 
experimental setting. We consider a nationally representative, large sample of 
consumers (of our two product categories), the largest we are aware of in terms 
of tax studies on diet choices; and we have an intertemporal if admittedly partial 
check about the effect of the online purchase on other purchases. Looking at a 
representative sample enables us to verify whether taxes on less healthy 
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products are more likely to be (in)effective with particular segments of the 
population, where evidence from existing research is mixed (see section 2). 
We focus on cereals and soft drinks as they are reasonably popular among UK 
households, include sizeable proportions of both healthy and unhealthy products 
within each category and are priced within the experimental budget of UK £10. 
From a public policy perspective, taxes on sugary soft drinks have been 
implemented in countries such as Mexico and are being debated in many 
countries (Cornelsen and Carreido 2015). In relation to the UK, an introduction 
of a price increase of a minimum of 10-20% via a tax or levy on high sugar 
products, such as on sugar-sweetened beverages, was one out of eight measures 
identified in Public Health England (2015) that could help facilitate a reduction 
in sugar intakes. Cereals are also interesting as they can make an important 
contribution to micronutrient intake. Many of them represent a good source of 
fiber (Williamson, 2010), though a considerable and growing proportion of 
cereals have high levels of sugar and salt (Action on Sugar, 2015).  
We consider price changes of 20% and 40%. We do not try to model price 
promotions but rather taxes, as this has been the almost exclusive focus in the 
recent policy debate. A price change of (around) 20% is standard in the literature 
(Bonnet and Réquillart, 2013; Briggs et al., 2013; Epstein et al., 2007; 
Waterlander et al., 2012a, 2012b), it is at the upper bound of food taxes typically 
considered by policy makers, and the lower bound of what public health 
researchers consider as necessary for making a significant, positive impact on 
health (Mytton et al., 2012). A price change of 40% is a ‘large’ change and 
provides a stress test for whether any effect can be found, given the 
inconclusiveness of the results in the literature. In all cases price changes are in 
the form of taxes, which rules out the possibility that lab behavior may be driven 
by stockpiling (as there cannot be offers better than those found in the natural 
world, to which our baseline prices are benchmarked against), though it does 
not rule out other kinds of compensation effects, which we deal with using a 
post-experimental shopper diary. 
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In brief, our key result is that taxation of less healthy cereals and soft drinks 
has a sizeable negative impact on their purchases, particularly, in the case of 
cereals, when the price change is salient (signposted), though more generally 
the effects of signposting are nuanced. A policy ‘reasonable’ tax value of 20% 
is sufficient to lead to large changes in behavior, which is robust across product 
categories if and only if signposting is used. We find no evidence of adverse 
distributional effects between socioeconomic groups to worry about as a result 
of the price changes. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a literature review. Section 3 describes the online supermarket 
platform, the product categories and healthfulness classification, and the 
experimental design, as well as providing details on participants, procedures, 
variables and the econometric model being employed. Section 4 describes the 
sample characteristics and experimental results and section 5 includes a 
discussion. The online appendix reviews the shopper diary data. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Price Interventions 
With thus far few natural world policy impact evaluations and limited 
incentivized experimental evidence (see below), the bulk of the existing 
evidence on the effects of price (tax) of food and beverage on diet either relies 
(1) on epidemiological modelling studies (Briggs et al. 2013) or (2) on 
econometric analyses of the relationships between food prices and purchase, 
consumption or diet-related health (Powell and Chaloupka, 2009; Eyles et al., 
2012). A limitation of the former approach is that its results critically depend on 
underlying assumptions and scenarios considered in the model. Also, a 
limitation of the latter approach is that the observed variation in prices may be 
endogenous, resulting in biased estimates of the impact of price changes. While 
it is widely recognized that the case for diet-related taxation is far more nuanced 
than that for other commodities such as tobacco and alcohol, the picture from 
the existing modeling and econometric evidence is mixed. Thow et al. (2014) 
and Cornelsen et al. (2015, p.18) express contrasting views on the effectiveness 
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of the taxation on diet (positive and expressing doubt, respectively). Public 
Health England (2015) argue for price effects but note the limitations of existing 
research. Wright et al. (2017) express a similar qualified view but relying 
primarily on epidemiological modelling studies in their systematic review to 
argue for a positive finding – and not having any experimental study in their 
sample. A particularly useful, nuanced review of the empirical (and theoretical) 
evidence on SSB taxation is by Allcott et al (2018), if with a focus on the US 
evidence. Powell et al. (2013) provide estimates of price elasticities from their 
review, with an estimate of -1.2 for soft drinks; they do not study cereals and 
their sample is made only from US studies. As an example of a specific study, 
Nevo (2001) find that the elasticity is on average -1.53 in the US ready-to-eat 
cereals market. That is, assuming a linear relationship between the percentage 
change in price and the percentage change in demand, a 20% and 40% tax would 
lead to a reduction in purchases by ~30% and 60%, respectively.  
There is a limited if growing number of studies looking at the implementation 
of significant fiscal policy measures (Wareham and Jebb, 2015). Again there is 
a mixed picture, as apparent for example from what some see as a failure of the 
Danish fat tax (Snowdon, 2015), the limited population level effect in the case 
of the Chilean SSB tax (Caro et al., 2018, Nakamura et al., 2018) and conversely 
the seeming success of the Mexican excise tax on sugary soft drinks that has 
been found to have led to a reduction in purchasing of soft drinks by 6-9% over 
the first two years post-tax implementation (Colchero et al., 2016, 2017).1 In 
the case of the city-level tax in Berkeley, studies have found a 9% decline in 
purchases based on sales data, while self-reported changes in consumption 
indicated a 21% reduction of taxed soft drinks (Falbe et al., 2016, Silver et al., 
                                                 
1 The previous studies also find that the tax policies might not necessarily be fully passed through to consumer prices. 
In Mexico there is evidence of full pass-through at least in urban areas (Colchero et al., 2015), and more recently 
evidence of a more complete pass-through of the tax onto consumer prices (Grogger, 2017). In Berkeley, there is 
evidence of a comparatively moderate pass-through of the tax to consumer prices (Cawley and Frisvold, 2017: 43%; 
Falbe et al., 2016: 46-69%). However, Silver et al. (2017) conclude that the degree of pass-through depends on store 
type: they find a complete pass-through in supermarket chains and gas station chains, whereas the pass-through was 
modest or even negative in pharmacies, independent corner stores and independent gas stations. Berardi et al. (2016) 
find evidence of pervasive if heterogeneous pass-through with French soda tax data, if incomplete for flavored waters. 
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2017). To date, no rigorous evaluations have been undertaken on the United 
Kingdom, Finland and Hungary. While essential, a downside of real world tax 
policy evaluations remains in the limited degree of causal inference that can be 
achieved – due to the lack of a proper control group and the typically complex 
circumstances in which such policies are implemented. For example, many 
claims from observational findings are not seen when studied in randomized 
trials (Ioannidis, 2013) and may instead reflect complex and insufficiently 
controlled socio-economic patterns of behavior (Lawlor et al., 2004). Hence, 
there is an important complementary role for experimental studies. 
There has been a small number of recent randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
of subsidies to increase purchases of healthier foods, typically fruit and 
vegetables (Waterlander et al., 2013; Ball et al., 2015), as opposed to the 
potentially more interesting (from a policy viewpoint) case of taxes which we 
focus on in this paper. Epstein et al. (2012) and Shemilt et al. (2013) present 
reviews of experimental evidence on the effect of price changes (generally not 
labeled as taxes) and this presents mixed results: much of the existing evidence 
(e.g., Epstein et al., 2010; Giesen et al., 2011; Waterlander et al., 2012a, 2012b) 
is based on hypothetical choices by unincentivized participants (typically but 
not always students). Furthermore, it is common to structure the shopping task 
as an assignment (e.g., think of shopping for a dinner, or for a day of food), 
which may affect demand by inducing participants (especially those more 
sensitive to experimenter demand) to buy anyway. We now refer to four studies 
that go at least partially beyond this paradigm. Février and Visser (2004) used 
real budgets and a random population sample to test the GARP axiom with an 
orange juice purchasing task; their interest is not in estimating price effects. 
Yang and Chiou’s study (2010) on beverages is partially incentivized and find 
evidences of price effects, more pronounced when they are exposed to health 
claims regarding the beverages. Theirs is a partial exception to an entirely 
hypothetical setup in that the beverages were actually purchased; however, 
unspent budgets were lost, which may have biased the results. Darmon et al. 
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(2014) and Muller et al. (2016) ran insightful incentivized shopping 
experiments across 180 products in a variety of product categories, with a 
convenience sample especially targeting low income women. Darmon et al. 
(2014) found a significant effect on the quantity of unhealthy products only with 
a combination of a 30% price increase and decrease on unhealthy and healthy 
food respectively, and recognized the potential of a regressive effect of the tax 
intervention. Muller et al. (2016) found that low income mothers were more 
price sensitive than the benchmark group – in line with theoretical predictions 
by Mytton et al. (2007) -, but with mixed effects on health inequality depending 
on the intervention. Limitations of these experiments are that the shopping tasks 
are structured as an assignment, which may affect demand schedules; that there 
is not a one-to-one correspondence between shopping made and obtained (due 
to having access to a subset of grocery goods); and the lack of any control for 
order effects. A more general limitation of all experimental studies is the lack 
of control for compensation effects between shopping in the laboratory and later 
shopping. 
Overall, there is not a clear conclusion on the health inequality impact 
resulting from tax interventions, neither from non-experimental evidence. 
Briggs et al. (2013) predict no significant difference in the impact of sugar 
sweetened drink tax in the UK, and Blakely et al. (2011) find no differential 
impact (by income and education group) of a subsidy on fruit and vegetables in 
their randomized control trial in New Zealand. Sharma et al. (2014) argue for a 
positive effect based on an econometric analysis of the Australian sugar tax. 
Smed et al. (2007) reach broadly a similar conclusion with Danish data 
estimated price elasticities. Based on theory-based simulations, Schroeter et al. 
(2008) warn however that a high calorie tax may be deemed equitable only if 
combined with income redistribution to low income households.   
2.2 Signposting interventions 
There has been growing policy interest in the use of “nudge” or “choice 
architecture” approaches to correct behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; 
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Marteau et al. 2011; Hollands et al. 2013, 2017; Guthrie et al. 2015). Nudges 
are “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives.” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, p. 8).  One type of nudge that 
would be of policy interest to use alongside fiscal policies is recognized to be 
signposting of complementary information to raise awareness at the point-of-
purchase (Hawkes et al 2015). Signposting information can affect behavior 
regardless of whether the consumer is aware of the reference price since the 
signposting can partition the products (taxed vs un-taxed) and reduce the 
cognitive load for the decision-maker (Johnson et al., 2012).  
Guthrie et al. (2015) distinguishes nudge type interventions such as ours from 
education-based interventions. ‘Significantly changing economic incentives’ is 
normally interpreted with respect to the benchmark of the purely rational and 
self-interested agent. From the perspective of a rational consumer who only 
cares about the price and who has no attention constraints, and noting that only 
one shopping task counts towards payment, being informed that part of the price 
is made up of a tax should be irrelevant. Therefore, there is no significant change 
in economic incentives and signposting can be classified as a nudge.  
Out of the wide range of potential nudge approaches, only very little research 
effort has gone into studying the effect of signposting information in the context 
of diet-related fiscal policies. With the exception of Zheng et al. (2013: theory 
and simulations), research has been conducted using an experimental approach. 
In non-diet related settings, Chetty et al. (2009) may have been the first to 
examine the impact of making explicit a commodity tax in the price tag, finding 
that this did increase the consumers’ sensitivity to the tax. Sussman and Olivola 
(2011) found a general tendency for tax aversion, namely consumers disliking 
taxes more than equivalent price changes. Goldin and Homonoff (2013) found 
that high income consumers were less responsive than low income consumers 
to a tobacco tax that was levied at the cashier but were similarly responsive to a 
tax that was presented in the price tag. Feldman and Ruffle (2015) found that, 
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while tax-exclusive prices with the announcement of tax inclusion at point of 
purchase are effective in increasing consumption relative to a case where tax is 
explicitly included at point of purchase, subsidy-exclusive prices with the 
announcement of subsidy inclusion at point of purchase make no difference. 
Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018) found individual heterogeneity in the degree 
to which subjects under-react to a sales tax that is not made salient. They also 
show that this heterogeneity significantly increases the efficiency loss due to 
distortion of demand driven by such a non-salient tax.  
In their systematic review of health focused tax interventions (not just food 
related), Wright et al. (2017) note the lack of studies combining the two even 
though they recognize it as a possible reason why US studies of tax interventions 
in their sample (where taxes are signposted) tend to show stronger effects than 
those elsewhere (where taxes are not sign-posted). 
In a diet context, Chen et al. (2015) is the only related experiment we are 
aware of. They conducted a laboratory experiment with non-student university-
connected adults, who first made purchases with a $10 voucher with baseline 
food prices and then made purchases with another $10 voucher with prices of 
unhealthy products increased by 20%. They either have a treatment where on 
top of the screen they state “A 20% ‘unhealthy food’ excise tax has been added 
to the price of unhealthy food and beverages” or a treatment where on top of the 
screen they state that “A 20% ‘unhealthy food’ sales tax will be added to your 
purchase when you check out.” They found effects on purchases of both 
signposting methods, though more in the first than the second case. There are a 
number of limitations to this study, which we do not have in ours. First, and 
while not explaining between-treatment differences, the two shopping tasks act 
cumulatively, which means that subjects’ behavior may rationally be affected 
by what they remember choosing in the first task. Second, as in Yang and Chiou 
(2010), unspent budgets are lost. Third, there is a wealth of information 
provided in terms of ‘unhealthy food’, making more psychological effects than 
just those entailed by a tax label at work, including potentially experimenter 
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demand. Fourth, the effect of signposting is mediated by not controlled subjects’ 
beliefs about what makes an unhealthy product, as well as by whether there is 
or is not recall of earlier prices in the first treatment.    
3. Study Platform and Design 
3.1 Online supermarket platform 
A website built to emulate an online supermarket platform was used. The 
website was developed by Cauldron Inc. for the BHRU, 
http://cauldron.sc/clients#woods. The website mimics the appearance of a 
regular online grocery store, including browsing, search, unique product pages, 
trolley and checkout. Image, price, full description, and a table of 
macronutrients were available for each product. The platform automatically 
collects a range of data, i.e. product name, price, number of units purchased, 
price information, nutrient content, browsing history and time spent within the 
site. The platform was built for assessing the effectiveness of a series of food 
purchase interventions (Forwood et al., 2015) and further modified for this 
study. In this study the range of products was restricted to two target categories 
– cereals (189 products) and soft drinks (709 products). The food database was 
a copy of the range of products for the corresponding categories from the largest 
supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, Tesco (scraped from Tesco.com in 
August 2015), supplemented with nutrient composition per 100 g (100 ml) from 
food (drinks) labels available at Tesco.com or from databases for common foods 
supplied by MRC Human Nutrition Research (Fitt et al., 2015). Tesco’s market 
share at the time of the experiment was 28.3% (McKevitt, 2015). Grocery 
deliveries were organized by the team using Tesco’s home delivery service.  
In our experiment we only included breakfast cereals and soft drinks (only 
one category per task). The number of products per page was customized to be 
up to 50, and price manipulations and signposting were implemented according 
to the treatment. A demo (not restricted to breakfast cereals and soft drinks, and 
with baseline prices) can be found at http://woodssupermarket.co.uk/login? 
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demo=1. Additional demo videos showing relevant price manipulations and 
signposting, as implemented in the experiment, are available upon request.  
3.2 Product categories and healthfulness classification 
As noted, we focused on the following product categories: (i) cereals, which 
included ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, muesli and granola and (ii) soft drinks, 
which included sports and energy drinks, waters, juices and fizzy drinks. We 
exclude fresh milk, fresh fruit juices and similar products on the grounds of their 
perishability and the risk of problems associated with delivery. Products in both 
the cereal and the soft drinks categories were divided into two groups: healthier 
and less healthy. We classified products into those groups based on the same 
criteria used by the UK broadcasting regulator Ofcom to enforce restrictions of 
television advertising to children. Those criteria rely on the UK Food Standards 
Agency’s nutrient profiling (NP) model (Rayner et al. 2005). An advantage of 
this method is that it provides a unified measure of healthiness across all 
available food and drink products (Nakamura et al., 2015). The model uses a 
simple scoring system based on the nutrient content of 100g of a food or drink. 
The score for each product is based on the energy density, saturated fat, total 
sugar and sodium and protein contents together with an estimate of the fruit, 
vegetable, and nut contents. An increase in the NP score reflects a reduction in 
the healthiness of the product. In order to classify products, we followed the 
same thresholds used by Ofcom to regulate food and drinks advertisement to 
children, that is, foods scoring 4 or more and drinks scoring 1 or more are 
defined as less healthy, and those scoring less are defined as healthier.2 Lobstein 
and Davies (2009) offer a comprehensive discussion on nutrient profiling 
models for public health policy purposes. 
                                                 
2 Some examples of less healthy cereals are: Kellogg’s Rice Krispies (score = 6), Nestle Cheerios Cereal (score = 8) 
and Kellogg’s Frosties Cereal (score = 13) and examples of healthier cereals are: Nestle Shredded Wheat Cereal (score 
= -6), Alpen No Added Sugar Muesli (score = -3) Dorset Cereals Honey Granola (score = 0). Examples of less healthy 
soft drinks are: regular tonic water (score = 1), regular Coke (score = 2) and Lucozade Energy (score = 3), while water 
(score = 0), Diet Coke (score = 0) and orange juice from concentrate (score = -3) are examples of healthier drinks. 
Notice that a healthier food or drink is a relative concept and depends on the threshold applied; hence it is not necessarily 
equal to what would be generally accepted as a healthy food or drink. A good example is diet sodas, which are healthier 
than sugar added soft drinks, but would not be considered healthy per se.  
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3.3 Design 
Participants had a budget (U.K. £10) and undertook a series of online 
shopping tasks.3 In each shopping task, items from only one product category 
(either cereals or soft drinks) were available for purchase. In the baseline tasks, 
one for each product category, item prices were matched with Tesco.com prices 
(excluding promotions). In the intervention tasks, the prices of either less 
healthy (healthier) products were taxed by either 20% or 40%, while the prices 
of the healthier (less healthy) products remained at the baseline level. This 
results in a total of ten shopping tasks, five for each product category, namely: 
(i) baseline prices, (ii) 20% tax on less healthy products, (iii) 40% tax on less 
healthy products, (iv) 20% tax on healthier products, and (v) 40% tax on 
healthier products. These price interventions allowed us to estimate the effect 
of our price interventions within each product category. While only the case of 
taxes on the less healthy products is of direct policy interest and of interest in 
this paper, we decided to be symmetrical between the two cases in order to avoid 
making overly transparent what the experiment is about, and therefore to reduce 
the likelihood of experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010).  
In addition, participants were randomly allocated to one of the following 
treatments: Signposted tax and Not Signposted tax. In the Signposted tax 
treatment the amount of the price increase is presented separately from the 
original price and flagged as a tax, whereas in the Not Signposted treatment the 
price increase is kept implicit (only the final price is presented). Figure 1 shows 
an example of a 20% tax on a less healthy cereal. An important distinction 
between this treatment and previous studies such as Chetty et al. (2009) is that 
in our study the participants always face tax, signposted or not, at the point of 
                                                 
3 A potential concern is that £10 could induce an income effect that might distort our results. While we do not believe 
this credible in a UK context (£10 is just a little over 1 hour of minimum wage pay), we test for whether household 
income correlates to purchases made and find no evidence for this (see section 4). Also, a pilot experiment controlled 
for whether the fact that the £10 were not earned made a difference, which it did not (see online appendix C). 
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choice, whereas in other studies consumers only face tax at the cashier in a non-
salient condition (but they see tax in the price tag in a salient condition).    
The price intervention was a within-subject manipulation while the 
signposting intervention was done between-subjects, with 500 subjects in each 
category (with the number of observations within each product category being 
equal to 500 subjects x 5 tasks). 4  We used a standard Random Incentive 
Mechanism, i.e. once participants complete all shopping tasks one shopping 
task was randomly selected and played out for real, i.e. participants received the 
groceries delivered to their homes and the remainder of the budget was credited 
to them by the survey company (Research Now). The instructions never referred 
to taxes as either ‘fat taxes’ or ‘sugar taxes’. This follows standard experimental 
methodology, and again helps control for experimenter demand effects 
particularly in an initial study. 
The order in which products appeared on the Woods online supermarket 
platform was exactly the same within subjects, price manipulations and 
signposting treatments. This order was pre-determined by the order that 
Tesco.com had set at the time of the experiment to organize products online (all 
the information including the order was retrieved from their application-
programming interface – API). 5 To minimize order effects, we set up each 
product page to show up to 50 products without having to click “Next page”, 
and so in one page most of the products belonging to the same sub-category 
were shown together. In addition, as in real online retail shopping sites, in our 
                                                 
4 Having a control group of participants who never face any tax would only be possible if we had opted for a full 
between-subjects design, i.e. each individual is exposed to only one treatment (price manipulation). If we had followed 
this approach, we would have required a much larger sample to have similar statistical power, which would have been 
unfeasible. Note that each group would need to be sufficiently large to contain a representative sample of the UK 
population. A further advantage of having a within-subject design is that its internal validity does not depend on random 
assignment and they lend themselves to more powerful econometric techniques (Charness et al, 2012). Natural world 
food shopping is a repeated task, so a within-subjects design also does somehow reproduce real-world conditions. Tasks 
were presented in random order, which minimizes potential order biases, and our data analysis checks did not find 
evidence for any time sequence effects. 
5 Products organization follows an internal hierarchy grouping which is similar to the brick and mortar (B&M) 
supermarket departments, aisles and shelves. For instance, all drinks are grouped in the same product category (as they 
would be in the same department in a supermarket), and within this category products that share similar characteristics 
are grouped by sub-categories (as they will be within a supermarket aisles and shelves). As an illustration, “Drinks/ 
Soft Drinks/Colas” was a sub-category that a consumer in a Drinks task could see with a couple of clicks to get there. 
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experiment the participants had the possibility of using a search tool located at 
the top of the webpage to find products or group of products within the range 
available for that task. 
Participants were free to spend as much as desired from their £10 shopping 
budget, including the option of checking out with an empty basket. We decided 
to implement this design feature against the option of forcing participants to 
spend all or at least part of their shopping budget, because the latter would 
inflate the purchasing data unrealistically and potentially bias the estimation of 
tax effects. One of the potential negative consequences of this was having a 
large number of participants checking out with an empty basket. We reduced 
the risk of this happening by limiting subject eligibility to consumers who 
bought a product from each of the two target product categories (cereals and 
soft drinks) at least once in the last month. 
3.4 Participants 
A total of 1,000 participants (54.10% female; mean age 46.95, SD=15.9 years; 
BMI= 26.49, SD=5.28) completed the experiment. All participants were based 
in the UK and the sample was representative in terms of regions, gender, age 
ranges and social classification. Participants were recruited via Research Now, 
a market research online panel company (http://www.researchnow.com). Quota 
targets were based on the Office for National Statistics annual mid-year 
estimates 2014. We used three screening questions in order to restrict our 
sample to consumers who purchased the target products – cereals and soft drinks 
– at least once a month and were responsible for at least half of the shopping of 
their household. We also excluded respondents in a diet for medical reasons and 
those answering incorrectly one or more of the data quality questions. See Q1.2-
Q1.5 and Q1.7 in the appendix E for the questions’ exact phrasing.  
3.5 Procedure 
Participants took part in the study over the internet between August and 
October 2015, and both participant and experimenter were blind to treatment 
allocation. The experimental instructions can be found in online appendix E. 
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The study was conducted using specialized online survey software 
(www.qualtrics.com) and the Woods online supermarket discussed in section 
3.1. At initial assessment, participants completed a consent form, questions 
about their shopping habits and quality control questions. Participants not 
meeting the inclusion criteria and/or failing to answer correctly one or more of 
the quality control questions were excluded at this point. Eligible participants 
were randomly allocated to one of the two experimental treatments. Participants 
each completed ten shopping tasks, presented in random order. Both 
randomizations were performed using a built-in feature within the survey 
software. Product name, number of units purchased, price information, and total 
spending were recorded for analysis. Participants provided their address, 
relevant contact details and delivery preferences. Following completion of the 
shopping tasks, participants were informed which task (and hence products) was 
(randomly) selected to be delivered to them. Personally identifiable information 
was used solely for the purpose of organizing the delivery of the groceries to 
the participants, who knew this. Subsequently, participants answered a post-
experiment questionnaire. Within the next eleven days participants received the 
purchased groceries via Tesco.com and any unspent budget was transferred by 
the survey company via panel points rewards of equivalent value (within 28 
days after completion of the experiment).  
3.6 Variables 
We used the following outcome variables: the total quantity of less healthy 
cereals (weight in grams) purchased in each task by each participant; the total 
quantity of healthier cereals (weight in grams) purchased in each task by each 
participant; the total quantity of less healthy soft drinks (volume in ml) 
purchased in each task by each participant; and the total quantity of less healthy 
soft drinks (volume in ml) purchased in each task by each participant. For 
simplicity, from now on we will call these variables “volume purchased of …” 
as appropriate. We now list the other variables. 
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Socioeconomic status: As a measure of individual level socioeconomic status, 
participants provided their highest level of educational qualification attained, 
coded onto a six point scale ranging from 0 ‘No qualifications’ to ‘6 Degrees or 
higher’. As a measure of income, participants provided both their personal 
yearly income and their total household income before tax (participants selected 
from 4 income bands in each case). 
Participant characteristics: Data on gender, age, self-reported height and 
weight (used to calculate BMI), the number of adults and children living in their 
household, and being on a weight loss diet, was collected. 
Other control variables: We elicited participants’ time preferences using a ten 
choices discount rate price list for a six months’ time horizon, similar to 
Harrison et al. (2002). Participants were asked to provide an estimation of the 
number of days their stocks of soft drinks and their stocks of cereals would last 
until they would run out and need to buy some more. Participants were also 
asked to provide a measure of the frequency they purchased groceries online, 
and the frequency they shopped at Tesco, both variables coded on a 7 point 
Likert scale ranging from never to more than once a week. Finally, as a measure 
of price recollection, participants were asked to indicate their best guess of the 
regular retail price of six products, i.e. three cereals and three soft drinks.  
3.7 Econometric model 
We exploit the panel nature of the data in the analysis. Since the data on the 
volume of products purchased are censored at 0, we have the following Random 
Effects Tobit regression model (Wooldridge, 2010). For subject j in task t:  
(1) lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽1tax20𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽2�tax20𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻 × signpost𝑗𝑗� + 𝛾𝛾1tax40𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻+ 𝛾𝛾2�tax40𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻 × signpost𝑗𝑗� + 𝜃𝜃1tax20𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+ 𝜃𝜃2�tax20𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 × signpost𝑗𝑗� + 𝜇𝜇1tax40𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+ 𝜇𝜇2�tax40𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 × signpost𝑗𝑗� + 𝛿𝛿signpost𝑗𝑗 + 𝐳𝐳𝑗𝑗′𝝋𝝋+ 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗;                                         lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗   if  lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ > 0 and lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 0 otherwise. 
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ln𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 gives the volume of healthier and less healthy products purchased in each 
product category. We use a log-scaled variable because the distribution of 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is 
highly skewed (see the online appendix A for distributions). The log-scaled 
variable closely follows a normal distributions with no outlier values, except 
zero, which is addressed by using Tobit regression models. 
The key independent variables tax20𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  and tax40𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  are indicators of the 
price manipulations, representing the 20% or 40% tax on less healthy (LH) 
products, respectively. These variables are interacted with the indicator of the 
signpost condition. Note that the coefficients alone represent the impacts of the 
interventions on the latent outcome (lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ ), rather than the impacts on the actual 
outcome (lnY𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗). We are interested in the latter, and hence we re-evaluate the 
estimated coefficients to represent the partial effects on the actual outcome; this 
involves weighting of the estimated coefficients by the probability of not being 
censored. The vector 𝐳𝐳𝑗𝑗  includes various other variables as discussed. In order 
to take into account the within-subject correlation in purchasing, we estimate 
the standard errors of the parameters via block bootstrap, which gives subject-
level cluster-robust standard errors (Bertrand et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2008). 
4. Results 
Demographic characteristics of participants are presented in Table 1. The 
total number of participants was 1,000, with a total of 506 in the Not Signposted 
treatment and 494 in the Signposted treatment. There were no significant 
between-treatment differences in these characteristics. Tests employed are 
Pearson’s χ2 (for gender) and the two-sample Mann-Whitney U test for the ratio 
variables. The distribution of the ratio variables, which departs considerably 
from normality justifies using a non-parametric approach. 
The mean quantity purchased across all tasks was 1.5 kg of cereals and 5.6 
liters of soft drinks. Only about 5.6% purchases were zero (5.8% for cereals and 
5.4% for soft drinks). When only considering less healthy products within each 
task, the amount of zero purchases was 13.5% for cereals and 13.2% for soft 
19 
 
drinks. The weighted average price of purchased less healthy breakfast cereals 
(across all the tasks and weighted based on the quantity purchased) was £0.52, 
(SD: 0.20) per 100g and for soft drinks it was £0.16 (SD: 0.13) per 100ml.  
Figure 2 shows mean purchases of less healthy (healthier) products when 
prices of less healthy (healthier) were manipulated. Figure 3 relies on the 
econometric model to show the estimated effect and confidence intervals for 
each price manipulation on the volume of purchases of the less healthy taxed 
products for cereals and soft drinks, respectively. The model estimates are in 
Table 2, while Table 3 extracts the key information by presenting price and 
cross-price effect estimates for less healthy cereals and soft drinks 
corresponding to each price manipulation and treatment. While we report the 
results of regression models with the control variables, the general results 
remain the same with different combinations of controls or no controls at all. 
The corresponding results for healthier products are in the online appendix D. 
Mean values and distributions of volumes purchased at baseline prices and each 
price manipulation are also available in the online appendix (Figures A.1-A.4 
and Table A.1; this appears mainly driven by fewer units bought). 
Let us first focus on the Not Signposted treatment. Both the 20% and the 40% 
taxes on less healthy cereals significantly reduced the volume purchased of the 
taxed products (p<0.01: see Table 3), though the effect of the 40% tax was not 
significantly larger than that of a 20% tax. A 20% tax was sufficient to induce 
a 48% demand decrease for cereals. For soft drinks, in the Not Signposted 
treatment, a 40% tax was instead required to significantly reduce the purchasing 
of less healthy soft drinks. 
Result 1. With no signposting, while a 40% tax always works, a 20% tax is 
effective in reducing the demand for less healthy products in relation to cereals 
but not in relation to soft drinks.  
Let us now consider the Signposted treatment. Again the 20% and the 40% 
taxes on less healthy cereals significantly reduced the volume purchased of the 
taxed products (p<0.01), with no difference between the two. A 20% tax was 
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now sufficient to induce a 54% demand decrease for cereals. With signposting, 
a 20% tax was sufficient to induce a similar (53%) and significant demand 
decrease for soft drinks (p<0.01). 
Result 2. With signposting, a 20% tax is sufficient to significantly reduce the 
demand for less healthy products in relation to both cereals and soft drinks.  
There is no evidence that a tax on less healthy soft drinks increases the 
consumption of more healthy drinks. There is, however, evidence that a tax on 
less healthy cereals does significantly increase the consumption of healthier 
cereals, though only for the not signposted category (p<0.05 with a 20% tax; 
Table 3). 
Result 3. For both a 20% and a 40% tax rate, there is a sizeable cross-price 
effect increase in the purchasing of healthier cereals when a tax on less healthy 
cereals is introduced and there is no signposting. There is no such cross-price 
effect for soft drinks. 
As supplementary findings, and focusing only on ones consistent between 
cereals and soft drinks, Table 2 show that men generally bought less healthy 
cereals and soft drinks than women, and consumers with greater stocks at home 
bought less unhealthily. Interestingly, we found no robust evidence of greater 
income and a better education as a predictor for better diet choices, though there 
is some partial evidence to this effect in relation to soft drinks only. Stocks of 
food were negatively correlated with purchases of less healthy food (in 
supplementary work, we found this effect robust to whether there is 
signposting). 
Finally, we checked for potential differences in tax and signposting sensitivity 
by socioeconomic status, in particular participants’ household income level and 
educational level. Online appendices Tables A.2-A.3 show that the estimated 
effect of our price manipulations are not statistically different between the lower 
and the higher income group, while Tables A.4-A.5 show that there were no 
significant differences in price manipulation sensitivity between the less 
educated and the more educated group (95% confidence intervals for estimated 
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effects overlap). Using the same criteria, we found no significant differences 
when comparing the groups with lower and higher body mass index (Tables 
A.6-A.7) and between patient and impatient individuals, classified using our 
time preferences measure (Tables A.8-A.9). 
5. Discussion 
Do taxes on less healthy products lead to healthier diet choices in relation to 
breakfast cereals and soft drinks? The broad answer from our experiment is a 
clear yes, and quite independently of signposting. However, in the case of 
cereals, our findings suggest that signposting does seem to affect whether such 
taxes increase the purchasing of more healthy cereals (non-signposted case) or 
just reduce that of the less healthy cereals (signposted case).  
Does signposting matter? Yes in making the effectiveness of the tax 
interventions more robust, though the specific answer depends both on the 
product category and on what we are trying to achieve. Based on our results, the 
20% tax recommended by the WHO (2016) would only be effective in reducing 
the consumption of less healthy soft drinks if signposting is used. In the context 
of cereals, if the goal is to reduce the demand of less healthy cereals, there is 
clear evidence of a potentially substantial effect. The magnitude of this effect is 
potentially substantial, and would lend itself to a fairly straightforward, 
inexpensive policy implication – that food-related taxation could be more 
effective when it is combined with signposting on the price tag. The 
implementation of such a complementary ‘nudge’ policy would enhance the 
impact of the tax without imposing severe welfare loss, though we should 
recognize that its effectiveness may depend on the product category. The further 
qualification to this is that the consumption of healthier cereals would not be 
increased in case of signposting – this may or may not be problematic depending 
on a more comprehensive evaluation of optimal dietary choices. 
Our results are noteworthy as they are based on real purchases of a nationally 
representative sample of 1,000 consumers in the UK, the largest sample we are 
aware of for tax field studies on diet. The large sample size and 
22 
 
representativeness of the data, combined with experimental control over price 
and signposting variations as well as controls for compensation effects and a 
range of other factors, provide a valuable contribution on the impact of the tax 
on food and beverages, and should thus credibly inform the current policy 
debate on the subject. Our study also goes beyond the limitations of Chen et al. 
(2015; see sub-section 2.2) in innovatively providing an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of signposting in diet context. 
Why does signposting matter? There are a number of mechanisms which 
explain why signposting can be effective as a nudge for a behavioral consumer. 
First, it may increase the salience of a price change relative to a reference price. 
Second, it may inform consumers with limited attention that the price is 
different. We note that that the asymmetric results with taxes and subsidies by 
Feldman and Ruffle (2015), with signposting of taxes mattering but signposting 
of subsidies not mattering, cast some doubt on these specific interpretations. 
That said, because their implementation of signposting is different and they do 
not focus on diet, further research is needed to test these possible mechanisms. 
Third, along the lines of Johnson et al. (2012), signposting may reduce the 
cognitive load of the decision maker by partitioning the products as taxed or 
untaxed. Fourth, it may inform the consumer that part of an overall price is made 
up of a tax. Both the third and fourth channels do not however explain why 
consumers react to a tax as they do. Tax aversion (Sussman and Olivola, 2011) 
explains this and is consistent with the evidence by Feldman and Ruffle (2015). 
Natural world implementation of signposting of a price would be framed as a 
tax and therefore we retained this feature. Our tax signposting was deliberately 
minimal, and set up for an initial experiment such as ours (together with the 
taxation on healthy products) to minimize the transparency of the objective of 
the experiment and therefore avoid experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). 
Future research could helpfully determine the effect of an entirely neutral label 
as this could help test for tax aversion as an explanation. It could also determine 
the effect of a stronger frame, e.g. labeling the tax as a ‘health tax’. This could 
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plausibly increase the impact of the health tax, although there have been enough 
examples of public backlash against soda tax and other health interventions that 
this is not a foregone conclusion (Wright et al., 2017; Just, 2017). 
Own-price effects. We recognize that our estimates of the own-price effects 
are larger than what has been found in previous research (Briggs et al., 2013; 
Andreyeva et al., 2010). The fact that we have pre-filtered the sample for 
participants with latent demand does not explain why there is a higher estimate 
than in econometric studies estimates, as these are based on empirical demand 
functions that, by definition, rely on latent demand (e.g., if you never buy 
cereals, you will not affect the slope of the demand for cereals function). In 
comparison to our around 50% drop in demand for a 20% tax, Nevo (2001) 
found that the elasticity is on average -1.53 in the US ready-to-eat cereals 
market, i.e. assuming linearity (that is, a linear relationship between the 
percentage change in price and the percentage change in demand),  a 20% and 
40% tax would lead to a reduction in purchases by about 30% and 60%, 
respectively. Our results suggest that the marginal proportionate effect of 
taxation diminishes as the tax rate is raised from 20% to 40%, for both cereals 
and soft drinks. When clearly signposted, even a small tax could make a 
substantial difference, which is consistent with the other signposting research 
as discussed in sub-section 2.2 (though comparing magnitudes is unfeasible 
given differences in experimental designs and how signposting is implemented). 
A potential issue with our results, as well as other research in this area, is that 
there may be compensation effects such that the study manipulation, while 
effective in terms of direct study outcomes, would be made pointless by later 
unhealthy purchases. We need to recognize that the current non-experimental 
evidence also does not necessarily address the compensation effect problem. 
We do not know the extent to which, for example, Mexican consumers have 
replaced sugar consumption with equally harmful sugar surrogates. 
In order to examine any potential compensation effect between our online 
shop and alternative shopping opportunities, upon completion of the online 
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shopping, participants were invited to record their purchases of the two relevant 
product categories as well as the additional category “chocolate” for one week 
after they received the shopping basket delivered to their homes. Below, we 
refer to this part of our study as the shopper diary. 
Online appendix B describes the results from the aforementioned shopper 
diary trying to provide a first and partial control for compensation effects, and 
findings do not support this possibility. Note though that this was not because 
participants treated the experimental task in artificial isolation; the strong 
negative correlation between stocks of soft drinks/cereals and experimental 
purchases is clear evidence that this was not the case.  
Our shopping diary data is not conclusive regarding the absence of any 
compensation effects, which of course may take place over a period longer than 
one week after receipt of the groceries, and may involve other product 
categories. We cannot therefore entirely rule out that our price effects may be 
overestimated because of potential compensation effects. However, the 
evidence we have does not point in that direction, as (for example) we did not 
find a correlation between a reduction in less healthy soft drinks purchases in 
the study and an increase in less healthy soft drinks purchases at least in the one 
week after the groceries were received (see the online appendix B). Note also 
that stockpiling is not an explanation, because the effect of taxes was to worsen 
the deal to what could be found in the natural world, not to provide particularly 
good deals. Overall, our results should be considered as evidence for the 
effectiveness of taxation, particularly when signposted, but not clearly as 
evidence for the specific quantitative size of the effect, which obviously needs 
to be seen in complement with other and non-experimental evidence.  
Other limitations. Another potential limitation of our analysis is that 
participants may be subject to house money effects, namely they may behave 
differently if the money is just given to them – as it was in our setup – as opposed 
to being earned. However, in a pilot we ran with university students (see online 
25 
 
appendix C), we tested for house money effects and found no evidence of them 
in our setting. We therefore opted for simplicity in the online study design. 
A different limitation of our analysis is that we were unable to provide directly 
money because of constraints from the market survey company. However, we 
note that the market survey company sees rewards points as effective in 
recruiting and retaining participants in their subject pool for a wide range of 
studies as ‘quasi-currency’. can be converted into vouchers/gift cards of a wide 
variety of retailers including Tesco.com, another major UK supermarket chain 
(Sainsbury’s), the largest UK department store (M&S), the largest UK catalogue 
retailer (Argos), major coffee and cinema chains, other major retailers and even 
Amazon  (see https://www.valuedopinions.co.uk/rewards). This supports their 
status as ‘quasi-currency’. 
A further limitation of our analysis might be considered that we focus on just 
two product categories. Focusing on one category of products at a time helps 
simplify the decision task considerably for our online shopper (particularly 
those less familiar with an online shopping environment), and given the strict 
constraints on time for an online experiment of this kind, we saw this as 
important to preserve data quality. 
An alternative simplification procedure would have been to have a ‘sparse 
set’, with only a few products available in each product category. However, and 
bearing in mind the habitual nature of consumption of many product categories 
(e.g., in relation to regular consumption of cereals), it would have led to 
preference-based biases in demand patterns due to the specific products on sale 
(e.g., if Rice Krispies cereals are taxed but a healthier alternative which I would 
be comfortable buying is not on offer). 
Focusing on our two product categories also helps with the interpretability of 
the results in terms of definition and therefore identification of healthy and 
unhealthy products. We designed the intervention to target nutrient profile and 
not individual macro-nutrients. Specifically, for both cereals and soft drinks we 
used the UK Food Standards Agency’s NP model to score and classify products 
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into two types: healthier and less healthy, and tax them accordingly. In line with 
this, our main outcome variable focuses on the quantity of foods/drinks as 
classified using the aforementioned criteria. Though NP does not address all 
aspects of nutrition, it is more comprehensive than looking at a single macro-
nutrient or at calories. Within composite foods healthier foods with lower 
nutrient profile scores may have lower content of undesirable nutrients (sugar, 
fat or calories), and they may have higher content of desirable nutrients (fiber, 
protein), and benefits offered by an intervention based on nutrient profile are 
likely spread across all macronutrients and not any one in particular. This is in 
line with a recognition that no single macronutrient is responsible for poor 
dietary health. That said, within both cereals and soft drinks, our nutrient profile 
does follow sugar content quite closely, making the interpretation of our results 
more straightforward also on this respect. 
Socioeconomic differences. Our results also show no significant difference in 
the impacts of taxes between socioeconomic groups. One concern is that this 
may be because everybody is given the same budget. However, under the 
assumption of integration between natural world wealth and experimental 
wealth (which may of course not necessarily hold), it is plausible that 
socioeconomic characteristics could have played a role. 
In contrast to Goldin and Homonoff’s (2013) tobacco study, we also do not 
find significant differences in the effect of the signposting intervention across 
different socioeconomic groups. Therefore, our results do not support the claim 
that diet-related taxation (with or without signposting) would reduce 
socioeconomic inequalities in diet and related health outcomes. Neither though 
would our results give rise to the concern that such inequalities will increase. 
Taken literally, this would imply that taxation could improve overall population 
diet without having to incur the cost of widening socioeconomic inequalities in 
diet (and related health outcomes). 
Policy implementation. A policy implementation of a tax on less healthy food 
and drinks would obviously need to make choices on which products should be 
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taxed (whether that be based on the FSA Nutrition score or some other criterion). 
If the tax is based on a nutrient attribute, industry may modify the attribute to 
avoid it, i.e. pass-through should not be considered as automatic. Ito and Sallee 
(2018) found that this has happened in the market of cars, where a fuel economy 
tax is levied based on the size/weight of the car. Grogger (2017) looked at the 
tax pass-through of the Mexican soda tax, and found that, in the short run, the 
price of sodas actually increased by more than the amount of the tax. 
A related policy question is the value of the optimal tax rate. The maximum 
level of the tax that has been considered by policy makers is 20%, and obviously 
there are good reasons not to tax more than is needed. Our finding of a nonlinear 
impact of taxation provides some support to a tax rate of 20% rather than a 
higher value, though this depends on the rate of tax pass-through as well as the 
use of signposting. Further research could look in a more nuanced way at the 
impact of tax rates up to 20% to identify where the greatest marginal gains in 
terms of tax rate increases are obtained. 
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FIGURE 1. PRICE MANIPULATION: NOT SIGNPOSTED VS. SIGNPOSTED 
 
     Notes: The signposting manipulation was between-subjects, and therefore participants would either see the tax-
inclusive prices as in the first panel, or the tax identified separately and flagged as a tax as in the second panel. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. MEAN QUANTITY PURCHASED OF LESS HEALTHY (HEALTHIER) PRODUCTS WHEN PRICES 
OF LESS HEALTHY (HEALTHIER) WERE MANIPULATED 
 
 
FIGURE 3. ESTIMATED TAX IMPACT ON THE VOLUME PURCHASED ON TAXED LESS HEALTHY 
PRODUCTS 
36 
 
  
 
     Notes: Own-price effects that are estimated from the random effects Tobit regression models (see the regression 
models in Table 3). The bars show the average percentage change in the volume of purchases in each tax condition, as 
compared to the baseline condition without any price manipulations. Dark grey bars show the effects when tax was 
combined with the signposted treatment. 95% confidence intervals are presented in the figure and are based on block-
bootstrap cluster robust standard errors at participant level. 
 
TABLE 1. BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS 
    Treatment 
    
    
All   n 
Not 
Signposted n Signposted n 
                
Age, years    46.95 1000 46.72 506 47.18 494 
Gender (F), %   54.10   53.75 506 54.45 494 
BMI, kg/m2   26.49 983 26.81 487 26.16 494 
Education level     999   506   493 
     No qualifications, %     6.91   5.34   8.52   
<5 GCSEs/NVQ Level 1, %   15.42   15.81   15.01   
5 or more GCSEs/NVQ Level 2/1          
A-   level, %   19.62   20.75   18.46   
2 or more A-levels/NVQ Level 3, %   21.22   19.37   23.12   
Bachelor’s degree, %   25.23   27.27   23.12   
Post-Graduate degree or qualification, %      11.61   11.46   11.76   
 Household income     908   455   453 
Up to £15,499 per year, %   19.71   18.46   20.97   
£15,500–£24,999 per year, %   23.46   25.05   21.85   
25,000–£39,999 per year, %   29.3   28.13   30.46   
£40,000 or more per year, %   27.53   28.35   26.71   
Household size, n   2.64 1000  2.68 506  2.59 494  
Total participants, n     1000   506   494 
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TABLE 2. IMPACT OF TAXATION AND SIGNPOSTING ON THE LOG VOLUME OF LESS HEALTHY 
BREAKFAST CEREALS AND SOFT DRINKS PURCHASED (RANDOM EFFECT TOBIT MODEL).  
 
                  Breakfast cereals   Soft drinks 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
Tax Less-healthy 20%  -0.442*** -0.479***   -0.125 -0.147 
  (0.080) (0.081)   (0.170) (0.183) 
Interaction with signposted -0.141 -0.109   -0.459*** -0.450** 
  (0.192) (0.214)   (0.159) (0.179) 
Tax Less-healthy 40%  -0.657*** -0.709***   -0.670*** -0.683*** 
  (0.055) (0.050)   (0.072) (0.075) 
Interaction with signposted -0.322* -0.0945   0.0793 0.173 
  (0.165) (0.226)   (0.320) (0.393) 
Tax Healthier 20%  -0.117 -0.184*   0.127 0.240 
  (0.111) (0.112)   (0.224) (0.265) 
Interaction with signposted 0.368 0.601*   0.245 0.113 
  (0.258) (0.334)   (0.347) (0.335) 
Tax Healthier 40%  -0.0195 -0.0514   0.061 0.0476 
  (0.148) (0.147)   (0.21) (0.223) 
Interaction with signposted 0.412 0.609*   0.665 0.497 
  (0.301) (0.362)   (0.453) (0.457) 
Signposted -0.423*** -0.444***   -0.207 -0.196 
  (0.127) (0.126)   (0.220) (0.243) 
Gender (male=1)   -0.368***     -0.291* 
    (0.122)     (0.171) 
Age    -0.0232***     -0.0151* 
    (0.00681)     (0.00849) 
Log BMI   -0.177     -0.653 
    (0.579)     (0.704) 
In a weight loss diet (yes=1)   0.0529    -0.464*** 
    (0.221)    (0.148) 
Online grocery shopping frequency   0.0256    0.0693 
    (0.0572)    (0.0669) 
Tesco shopping frequency   0.0678    -0.0170 
  (0.0588)   (0.0692) 
Time preferences (discount)   0.0305    -0.0118 
    (0.0271)    (0.0331) 
Education level   -0.0411    -0.153* 
    (0.0725)    (0.0873) 
Household Income   0.135    -0.201* 
    (0.0918)    (0.117) 
Stocks of cereals (days)   -0.0264**     
    (0.0106)     
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Stocks of soft drinks (days)      -0.0310** 
       (0.0144) 
Accuracy guessing Cereal prices   0.187     
    (0.253)     
Accuracy guessing soft drink prices      -2.322** 
       (1.100) 
Observations 5000 4265   5000 4265 
Number of subjects 1000 853   1000 853    
Notes: The analysis is based on a random effect Tobit model where each choice made by a subject provides an observation. 
Partial effects on the observed volume of log purchases are presented. The estimated partial effects are also transformed to represent 
the proportionate effects. Subject-level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (block-bootstrapped, 1000 replications). The 
number of observations corresponds to five shopping tasks and is smaller in the regressions with controls because of omitted 
answers to control questions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED PRICE EFFECTS ON THE LOG VOLUME OF LESS HEALTHY AND HEALTHIER 
BREAKFAST CEREALS AND SOFT DRINKS BY TREATMENT  
  
Breakfast cereals 
  
Soft drinks 
  Less healthy Healthier  Less healthy Healthier 
Tax Less-healthy 20% -0.479*** 1.060**   -0.147 -0.242* 
(0.081) (0.427)   (0.183) (0.141) 
Tax Less-healthy 20% in -0.536*** 0.0821   -0.531*** 0.142 
signposted intervention (0.083) (0.191)   (0.114) (0.235) 
Tax Less-healthy 40% -0.709*** 1.543***   -0.683*** -0.064 (0.050) (0.534)   (0.075) (0.213) 
Tax Less-healthy 40% in  -0.736*** 0.221   -0.628*** 0.365 
signposted intervention 
(0.048) (0.230)   (0.087) (0.247) 
Tax Healthier 20%  -0.184* 0.103   0.240 -0.515*** (0.112) (0.220)   (0.265) (0.103) 
Tax Healthier 20% in 0.306 -0.560***   0.38 -0.365** 
signposted intervention 
(0.201) (0.084)   (0.314) (0.146) 
Tax Healthier 40% -0.0514 -0.226   0.048 -0.503*** (0.147) (0.163)   (0.223) (0.102) 
Tax Healthier 40% in 0.526** -0.741***   0.568* -0.675*** 
in signposted intervention (0.244) (0.054)   (0.335) (0.078) 
            
Control variables Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 4265 4265  4265 4265 
Number of subjects 853 853  853 853 
     Notes: The results are based on models (2) and (4), presented in Table 2. Partial effects on the observed 
volume of log purchases are presented. The estimated partial effects are also transformed to represent the 
proportionate effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
